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Abstract
We present a binary tree based parallel algorithm for extending the domain of a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF). For
t2, our algorithm extends the domain from the set of all n-bit strings to the set of all ((2t − 1)(n − m) + m)-bit strings, where
m is the length of the message digest. The associated increase in key length is 2m bits for t = 2; m(t + 1) bits for 3 t6 and
m × (t + log2(t − 1)) bits for t7.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
LetF= {hk}k∈K be a family of functions where each hk : X → Y . The setK is said to be the set of keys andF
is said to be a keyed family of functions. Consider the following adversarial game with respect to F: the adversary
outputs an x ∈ X; is then given a randomly chosen key k ∈ K; and has to output an x′ ∈ X such that x = x′ and
hk(x) = hk(x′). The family F is said to be a universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) if it is infeasible for an
adversary to win this game. The concept of UOWHF was introduced by Naor andYung [6] and used by them to show
that it is possible to construct secure digital signature schemes based on 1-1, one-way functions.
The notion of collision resistant hash function (CRHF) is more common in cryptography. In this notion, the adversary
is ﬁrst given a k and then has to output x and x′ such that x = x′ and hk(x)= hk(x′). Note that in the case of UOWHF,
the adversary has to commit to the input x even before he knows the function for which a collision is to be found.
Intuitively, this makes the adversary’s task more difﬁcult and hence UOWHF is considered to be a weaker primitive.
In fact, Simon [9] has shown that there is an oracle relative to which UOWHFs exist but not CRHFs.
A systematic study of construction methods for UOWHF was undertaken by Bellare and Rogaway [1]. The approach
taken in [1] is to start with a UOWHF {hk}k∈K, where the domain X1 of hk consists of short ﬁxed length strings and
then obtain methods to construct another UOWHF {Hp}p∈P where the domain X2 of Hp consists of long ﬁxed length
strings. Such a method is called a domain extending algorithm. Further, it is shown in [1], that extending the domain
also requires an increase in the length of the keys.
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The most important method in [1] is a tree based construction. For binary trees with t2 levels, the BR construction
extends the domain from n-bit strings to ((2t − 1)(n − m) + m)-bit strings and requires an associated increase in key
length by 2m(t − 1) bits, where the range Y of the hash functions consists of m-bit strings. Later, Shoup [8] provided
a sequential construction which requires an increase in key length of mt bits for extending the domain by the same
amount. Thus, the sequential algorithm has a smaller key length expansion compared to the earlier binary tree based
algorithm. Mironov [5] provided an alternative proof of correctness of Shoup’s result and showed that the key length
expansion is the best possible for any sequential algorithm.
The essential computational task in a domain extending algorithm consists of executing hk several times. In a binary
tree based algorithm, the different invocations of hk are organised in a binary tree. This opens up the possibility of
parallel execution using more than one processors. Such a parallel algorithm will have several parallel rounds. In each
round, all (or some) of the processors would operate in parallel and produce outputs to be used in the next round. Since
more than one processors work simultaneously, the number of parallel rounds will be less than the total number of
invocations of hk made by the algorithm. On the other hand, a sequential algorithm using one processor will require
time proportional to the total number of invocations of hk . There are standard ways to convert a binary tree structure
into an efﬁcient parallel algorithm (see [3]). Thus, even though the binary tree algorithm of [1] has a larger key length
expansion compared to the sequential algorithm of [8], it will be more efﬁcient to implement when more than one
processors are available.
In this work, we show that a modiﬁcation of the binary tree algorithm of [1] results in a smaller key length expansion
while retaining the advantage of parallelism. The key length expansion of our algorithm is 2m bits for t = 2; m(t + 1)
bits for 3 t6 and m × (t + log2(t − 1)) bits for t7. This is an improvement over the algorithm in [1] though it
is more than the key length expansion achieved in [8]. The improvement in key length expansion over [1] is achieved
by combining the construction in [1] with the construction in [8]. The proof of correctness of our algorithm employs
the technique used in [5] rather than the technique in [8].
2. Preliminaries
Let {hk}k∈K be a keyed family of hash functions, where each hk : X → Y . In this paper we require n2m. Consider
the following adversarial game.
1. Adversary chooses an x ∈ X.
2. Adversary is given a k which is chosen uniformly at random fromK.
3. Adversary has to ﬁnd x′ ∈ X such that x = x′ and hk(x) = hk(x′).
We say that {hk}k∈K is a universal one way hash family (UOWHF) if the adversary has a negligible probability of
success with respect to any randomized polynomial time strategy. A strategyA for the adversary runs in two stages.
In the ﬁrst stageAguess, the adversary ﬁnds the x to which he has to commit in Step 1. It also produces some auxiliary
state information s. In the second stageAﬁnd(x, k, s), the adversary either ﬁnds a x′ which provides a collision for hk
or it reports failure. BothAguess andAﬁnd(x, k, s) are randomized algorithms. The success probability of the strategy
is measured over the random choices made byAguess andAﬁnd(x, k, s) and the random choice of k in step 2 of the
game. We say thatA is an (, a)-strategy if the success probability ofA is at least  and it invokes the hash function hk
at most a times. In this case we say that the adversary has an (, a)-strategy for {hk}k∈K. Note that we do not include
time as an explicit parameter though it would be easy to do so.
In this paper we are interested in extending the domain of a UOWHF. Thus, given a UOWHF {hk}k∈K, with
hk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m and a positive integer Ln, we would like to construct another UOWHF {Hp}p∈P, with
Hp : {0, 1}L → {0, 1}m. We say that the adversary has an (, a)-strategy for {Hp}p∈P if there is a strategy B for the
adversary with probability of success at least  and which invokes the hash function hk at most a times. Note that Hp
is built using hk and hence while studying strategies for Hp we are interested in the number of invocations of the hash
function hk .
The correctness of our constructionwill essentially be aTuring reduction. (See [10] formore on this approach.)Wewill
show that if there is an (, a)-strategy for {Hp}p∈P, then there is an (1, a1)-strategy for {hk}k∈K, where a1 is not much
larger than a and 1 is not signiﬁcantly smaller than . This will show that if {hk}k∈K is a UOWHF, then so is {Hp}p∈P.
The key length for the base hash family {hk}k∈K is 	log2|K|
. On the other hand, the key length for the family
{Hp}p∈P is 	log2|P|
. Thus, increasing the size of the input from n bits to L bits results in an increase of the key size
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by an amount 	log2|P|
 − 	log2|K|
. From a practical point of view a major motivation is to minimise this increase
in the key length.
3. Known constructions
We brieﬂy discuss the sequential construction by Shoup [8] and the tree construction by Bellare–Rogaway [1].
3.1. Sequential construction
The Merkle–DamgAArd construction is a well-known method for extending the domain of a collision resistant
hash functions. However, Bellare and Rogaway [1] showed that the construction does not directly work in the case of
UOWHF. In [8], Shoup presented a modiﬁcation of the MD construction. We brieﬂy describe the Shoup construction
as presented in [5].
Let {hk}k∈K, with hk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m andK= {0, 1}K be the UOWHF whose domain is to be extended. Let x
be the input to Hp with |x| = r(n − m). We deﬁne p = k‖m0‖m1‖ . . . ‖ml−1 where l = 1 + log r and mi are m-bit
randomly chosen binary strings called masks. The increase in key length is lm bits. The output of Hp is computed by
the following algorithm. Deﬁne (i) = j if 2j |i and 2j+1i.
1. Let x = x1‖x2‖ . . . ‖xr , where |xi | = n − m.
2. Let IV be an n-bit initialisation vector.
3. Deﬁne z0 = IV, s0 = z0 ⊕ m0.
4. For 1 ir , deﬁne zi = hk(si−1‖xi) and si = zi ⊕ m(i).
5. Deﬁne zr to be the output ofHp(x).
A proof of correctness of the construction was described by Shoup in [8]. In a later work, Mironov [5] provided an
alternative correctness proof. More importantly, in [5] it was shown that the amount of key length expansion is the
minimum possible for the construction to be correct.
3.2. Tree based construction
In [1], Bellare and Rogaway described a tree based construction for extending UOWHF. We brieﬂy describe the
construction for binary trees. As before, let {hk}k∈K be the UOWHF whose domain is to be extended.
There are 2t − 1 processors P1, . . . , P2t−1 connected in a full binary tree of t levels numbered 1, . . . , t and 2t − 1
nodes. The processors P2i−1 , . . . , P2i−1 are at level i. The arcs in the binary tree point towards the parent, i.e., the arcs
are of the form (2i, i) and (2i + 1, i). Each processor is capable of computing the function hk for any k ∈ K, i.e.,
Pi(k, x) = hk(x), for an n-bit string x. In the rest of the paper we will always assume that t2. By level(i) we denote
the level of the tree to which Pi belongs. Thus, level(i)= j if 2j−1 i2j − 1. It is clear that all the nodes at the same
level can work in parallel.
Denote the extended domain UOWHF to be {Hp}p∈P. The input to the function Hp is x of length 2t−1n + (2t−1 −
1)(n − 2m). The key p for the function Hp is formed out of the key k for the function hk plus some additional m-bit
strings called masks. In the Bellare–Rogaway (BR) algorithm, we have p = k‖1‖1‖ . . . ‖t−1‖t−1, where i’s and
j ’s are randomly chosen m-bit strings. The computation of the function Hp(x) is done in the following manner.
BR Construction:
1. Write x = x1‖x2‖ . . . ‖x2t−1, where |x1| = · · · = |x2t−1−1| = n − 2m and |x2t−1 | = · · · = |x2t−1| = n; (note |x| =
2t (n − m) − (n − 2m).)
2. for 2t−1 i2t − 1, do in parallel
(a) compute zi = Pi(k, xi) = hk(xi);
(b) set si = zi ⊕ t−1 if i is even, and set si = zi ⊕ t−1 if i is odd;
3. for j = t − 1 down to 2 do
• for i = 2j−1 to 2j − 1 do in parallel
(a) zi = Pi(k, s2i‖s2i+1‖xi) = hk(s2i‖s2i+1‖xi).
(b) set si = zi ⊕ j−1 if i is even and set si = zi ⊕ j−1 if i is odd;
P. Sarkar / Discrete Applied Mathematics 155 (2007) 2174–2180 2177
4. deﬁne the output of Hp(x) to be hk(s2‖s3‖x1).
We note that in the original algorithm in [1], the strings x1, . . . , x2t−1−1 were deﬁned to be empty strings. The amount
of key length expansion is 2(t −1)m bits for a tree with t levels. Thus, 2(t −1) masks each of length m bits are required
by the construction.
Remark. The processors P1, . . . , P2t−1 are mentioned for the sake of clarity. In practice, the binary tree algorithm
described above can be carried out by 2t /t processors in not more than t + 	2t /
 rounds. This is a basic fact in
parallel computation (see, for example, [3]).
4. Improved tree based construction
As in the BR algorithm, assume that {Hp}p∈P is to be constructed from {hk}k∈K using the 2t − 1 processors
P1, . . . , P2t−1. As before, the input to the function Hp is a string x of length 2t−1n + (2t−1 − 1)(n − 2m) and the key
p for the function Hp is formed out of the key k for the function hk plus some masks. The deﬁnition of these masks in
our algorithm is different from that in the BR algorithm.
For convenience in describing the algorithm we divide these masks into two disjoint sets  = {1, . . . , t−1} and
= {0, . . . , l−1}, where l = 1 + log2(t − 1). Recall that for integer i, the function (i)= j if 2j |i and 2j+1i. The
new algorithm can be described by simply changing Lines 2(b) and 3(b) in the following manner.
Improved Tree Construction (ITC):
2(b) set si = zi ⊕ 0 if i is even and set si = zi ⊕ 1 if i is odd;
3(b) set si = zi ⊕ (t−j+1) if i is even and set si = zi ⊕ t−j+1 if i is odd.
We provide an explanation of the construction. Let P = Pir Pir−1 . . . Pi1 be a path of processors of length r from the
leaf node Pir to some internal node Pi1 which is obtained by following only left links, i.e., level(ir )= t and ij+1 = 2ij
for j = 1, . . . , r − 1. The arcs (ij+1, ij ) in the path are assigned masks according to the Shoup construction. Let S be
the set of arcs {(2i1 + 1, i1), (2i2 + 1, i2), . . . , (2ir−1 + 1, ir−1)}. The construction also ensures that no two arcs in S
get the same mask.
Proposition 1. The following are true for algorithm ITC.
1. t parallel rounds are required to compute the output.
2. The function hk is invoked 2t − 1 times.
3. The amount of key length expansion (|p| − |k|) is m(t + log2(t − 1)) bits.
Proof. (1) Step 2 of ITC is one parallel round. Step 3 requires (t − 2) parallel rounds and Step 4 requires one round.
Hence, a total of t rounds are required.
(2) There are 2t −1 processors and each processor invokes the function hk exactly once. Hence, hk is invoked exactly
2t − 1 times.
(3) The amount of key length expansion is m× |∪|. By deﬁnition || = t − 1 and || = 1 + log2(t − 1). Also
 ∩ = ∅. 
Remark. The amount of expansion in the BR construction is 2(t−1)m bits. Thus, with respect to key length expansion
ITC is an improvement over the BR construction.
Theorem 2 (Security reduction for Hp). If there is an (, a) winning strategy A for {Hp}p∈P, then there is an
(/(2t − 1), a + 2(2t − 1)) winning strategy B for {hk}k∈K. Consequently, {Hp}p∈P is a UOWHF if {hk}k∈K is
a UOWHF.
Proof. We describe the two stages of the strategy B as follows:
Bguess: (output (y, s), with |y| = n.)
1. RunAguess to obtain x ∈ {0, 1}L and state information s′.
2. Choose an i uniformly at random from the set {1, . . . , 2t − 1}.
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3. Write x = x1‖ . . . ‖x2t−1, where |x1| = · · · = |x2t−1−1| = n − 2m and |x2t−1 | = · · · = |x2t−1| = n.
4. If 2t−1 i2t − 1, set y = xi ; u1, u2 to be the empty string and s = (s′, i, u1, u2). Output (y, s) and stop.
5. If 1 i2t−1 − 1, then choose two strings u1 and u2 uniformly at random from the set {0, 1}m. Set y = u1‖u2‖xi
and s = (s′, i, u1, u2). Output (y, s) and stop.
At this point the adversary is given a k which is chosen uniformly at random from the setK={0, 1}K . The adversary
then runs Bﬁnd which is described below.
Bﬁnd(y, k, s): (Note s = (s′, i, u1, u2).)
1. Deﬁne the masks 1, . . . , t−1, 0, . . . , l−1 by executing algorithm MDef(i, u1, u2) (called the mask deﬁning al-
gorithm;will be described later). This deﬁnes the key p for the functionHp. Herep=k‖1‖ . . . ‖t−1‖0‖ . . . ‖l−1,
where l = log2(t − 1) + 1.
2. RunAﬁnd(x, p, s′) to obtain x′.
3. Letv andv′ be the inputs to processorPi corresponding to the strings x andx′, respectively.Denote the corresponding
outputs by zi and z′i . If zi = z′i and v = v′, then output v and v′, else output “failure”.
Note that Step 3 either detects a collision or reports failure. We now lower bound the probability of success. But ﬁrst
we have to specify the mask deﬁning algorithm.
The task of the mask deﬁning algorithm MDef is to deﬁne the masks 1, . . . , t−1, 0, . . . , l−1 (and hence p) so
that the input to processor Pi is y. Note that the masks are not deﬁned until the key k is given to the adversary. Once the
key k is speciﬁed we extend it to p such that the extension is “consistent” with the input y to Pi to which the adversary
has already committed. Another point that one has to be careful about is to ensure that the key p is chosen uniformly
at random from the set P, i.e., the masks i and j are chosen independently and uniformly to be m-bit strings.
The mask deﬁning algorithm MDef is given below. The algorithm uses an array A[..] of length at most (t −1) whose
entries are pairs of the form (j, v) where j is an integer in the range 1j2t − 1 and v is an m-bit string.
Algorithm MDef(i, u1, u2)
(Note: i was chosen by Bguess in Step 2. The strings u1 and u2 were chosen by Bguess either in Step 4 or in Step 5.)
1. If 2t−1 i2t − 1, then randomly deﬁne the masks 1, . . . , t−1, 0, . . . , l−1 and exit.
2.Append (2i + 1, u2) to the array A.
3. Let j = t − level(i), j1 = j − 2(j) and i1 = 2j−j1 i.
4. Randomly deﬁne all undeﬁned masks in the set (j1+1), . . . , (j−1).
5. If j1 = 0, then zi1 = hk(xi1),
6. else
(a) randomly choose u, v in {0, 1}m.
(b)Append (2i1 + 1, v) to the array A.
(c) zi1 = hk(u‖v‖xi1).
7. For j2 = j1 + 1, . . . , j − 1 do
(a) i2 = 2j−j2 i.
(b) s2i2 = z2i2 ⊕ (j2).
(c) Randomly choose w in {0, 1}m.
(d)Append (2i2 + 1, w) to the array A.
(e) zi2 = hk(s2i2‖w‖xi2).
8. (j) = z2i ⊕ u1.
9. If j1 > 0, then u1 = u, u2 = v, j = j1 and go to Step 2.
10. Randomly deﬁne all as yet undeﬁned masks i , 0 i l − 1.
11. Sort the array A in descending order based on the ﬁrst component of each entry (j, v).
12. For i1 = 1 to t − level(i) do
(a) Let (l, u) = A[i1].
(b) Compute zl to be the output of processor Pl . (This can be done, since at this point all masks used in the
subtree rooted at l have already been deﬁned.)
(c) Let j = t − level(l) + 1.
(d) Deﬁne j = zl ⊕ u.
13. Randomly deﬁne all as yet undeﬁned masks j , 1j t − 1.
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Intuitively, algorithm MDef applies the mask reconstruction algorithm for the Shoup construction along the path
P™r , P™r−1 , . . . , P™1 , where ™1 = i, ™j =2j−1i and level(™r )= t . This deﬁnes the masks (t−level(™j )) for 1j < r . To do
this the algorithm guesses the inputs that the processorsP™1 , . . . , P™r−1 obtain from their right descendants. These inputs
along with the proper processor numbers are added to the array A. Once the deﬁnition of the  masks are complete,
the algorithm begins the task of deﬁning the  masks. The ﬁrst element of the array A is (2™r−1 + 1, u) for some m-bit
string u and we are required to deﬁne 1. The processor P2™r−1+1 is at the leaf level and applies hk to x2™r−1+1 to produce
z2™r−1+1. Now 1 is deﬁned to be the XOR of u and z2™r−1+1. Suppose for some 2jr , the masks 1, . . . , j−1 has
already been deﬁned. The current element of the arrayA is (2™r−j +1, u) for some m-bit string u.At this point all masks
present in the subtree rooted at processor P2™r−j+1 have already been deﬁned. Thus, the input to processor P2™r−j+1 is
known. Hence, processor P2™r−j+1 applies the hash function hk to its input to obtain the string z2™r−j+1. The mask j
is now deﬁned to be the XOR of u and z2™r−j+1.
Notice that this procedure ensures that the input to processor Pi is the string y to which Bguess has committed. We
now argue that the masks are chosen randomly from the set {0, 1}m. For this we note that in MDef each mask is either
chosen to be a random string or is obtained by XOR with a random string. Hence, all the masks are random strings
from the set {0, 1}m. Also k is a random string and hence p is a randomly chosen key from the set P.
Suppose x and x′ collide for the function Hp. Then there must be a j in the range 1j2t − 1 such that processor
Pj provides a collision for the function hk . (Otherwise it is possible to prove by a backward induction that x = x′.) The
probability that j = i is 1/(2t − 1). Hence, if the success probability ofA is at least , then the success probability of
B is at least /(2t − 1). Also the number of invocations of hk by B is equal to the number of invocations of hk byA
plus at most 2(2t − 1). This completes the proof. 
4.1. Improvement on Algorithm ITC for t = 5, 6
Algorithm ITC uses two disjoint sets of masks and. For t=5, 6, we have={1, . . . , t−1} and={0, 1, 2}.
This results in a total of t + 2 distinct masks. The next result shows that t + 1 masks are sufﬁcient for these values of t.
Theorem 3. For t=5, 6, it is possible to properly extend aUOWHF {hk}k∈K to a UOWHF {Hp}p∈P using a processor
tree of 2t − 1 processors and requiring exactly t + 1 masks.
Proof. The algorithm is same as Algorithm ITC with the following small modiﬁcation. In Algorithm ITC the sets
= {1, . . . , t−1} and = {0, 1, 2} are disjoint. We remove this disjointness by setting 1 = 2. This results in a
total of t + 1 masks.
We have to show that setting 1 = 2 does not affect the correctness of the construction. More precisely, we have to
provide a security reduction similar to that of Theorem 2. A close examination of the proof of Theorem 2 shows that
the only part of the proof which will be affected by setting 1 = 2 is the mask deﬁning algorithm. Thus, it is sufﬁcient
to describe a proper mask deﬁning algorithm. We describe the mask deﬁning algorithm for t = 6 which will also cover
the case t = 5.
Let the processors for t = 6 be P1, . . . , P63. Suppose the output ofBguess is (y, s = (s′, i, u1, v1)). If i4, then the
mask deﬁning algorithm of Theorem 2 is sufﬁcient to deﬁne all the masks. This is because of the fact that inAlgorithm
ITC the mask 2 does not occur in the subtree rooted at i and hence we are required to deﬁne only 1. The problem
arises when we have to deﬁne both 1 and 2 using Algorithm MDef. Since in this case 1 = 2, deﬁning one will
deﬁne the other. Thus, we have to ensure that this particular mask is not redeﬁned.
There are three values of i that we have to consider, namely i = 1, 2 and 3. The case i = 1 is the most general as it
requires us to consider the full tree of 63 processors. The other two cases, i =2 and i =3 are simpler and are essentially
the same. These two cases require deﬁning the masks for a tree with 31 processors which correspond to t = 5. Here we
only describe the case of i = 1.
1. Randomly choose two m-bit strings u2 and v2. Deﬁne 0 = u1 ⊕ hk(u2‖v2‖x2).
2. Randomly choose two m-bit strings u3 and v3.
(a) Set w1 = hk(u3‖v3‖x8).
(b) Set w2 = w1 ⊕ 0.
(c) Randomly choose an m-bit string v4.
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(d) Set w3 = hk(w2‖v4‖x4).
(e) Deﬁne 2 = u2 ⊕ w3.
3. (a) Set w4 = 0 ⊕ hk(x32).
(b) Set w5 = 1 ⊕ hk(x33). (Note that 1 = 2 has been deﬁned in Step 2(e).)
(c) Deﬁne 1 = u3 ⊕ hk(w4‖w5‖x16).
4. Compute the output of processor P17 and call it w6. Deﬁne 2 = w6 ⊕ v3.
5. Compute the output of processor P9 and call it w7. Deﬁne 3 = w7 ⊕ v4.
6. Compute the output of processor P5 and call it w8. Deﬁne 4 = w8 ⊕ v2.
7. Compute the output of processor P3 and call it w9. Deﬁne 5 = w9 ⊕ v2.
It is not difﬁcult to verify that the above algorithm properly deﬁnes all the masks. Further, each mask is obtained by
XOR with a random m-bit string and hence the concatenation of the (t + 1) different masks is a random bit string of
length m(t + 1). This completes the proof of the theorem. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the problem of extending the domain of a UOWHF using a binary tree algorithm.
As shown in [1] this requires an expansion in the length of the key to the hash function. To extend the domain from
n-bit strings to ((2t − 1)(n − m) + m)-bit strings, our algorithm makes a key length expansion of 2m bits for t = 2;
m(t + 1) bits for 3 t6 and m(t + log2(t − 1)) for t7 where m is the length of the message digest. The binary
tree algorithm of Bellare and Rogaway [1] requires a key length expansion of 2m(t − 1) with the same parameters.
Hence, the key length expansion in our algorithm is smaller. However, it is greater than the sequential algorithm due
to Shoup [8], which requires a key length expansion of mt for the same parameters. On the other hand, the advantage
of the BR and our binary tree algorithm is that it is parallelizable while Shoup’s algorithm is not.
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